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Abstract 
Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically 
analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results 
show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a 
country, while political decentralization has no impact. The effects of decentralization do not 
transmit through government efficiency and effectiveness, in line with the system stability 
hypothesis of Frey and Luechinger (2004).  
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1. Introduction 
Following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center the latest, transnational terrorism 
became subject of intense research. Still, what determines the terrorists’ choice of target 
countries is not yet fully understood. Previous research suggests that political institutions are 
important. It has been shown, among others, that target countries’ degree of democracy, 
electoral system or institutional constraints to the central government are determinants of 
terror (Abadie 2006, Frey and Luechinger 2004, Li 2005, Li and Schaub 2004).
1  
In this paper, we propose an additional institutional determinant of transnational terror: 
a target country’s degree of decentralized governance structure. According to the analysis in 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008), decentralization increases individual well-being, while 
Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2007) show terrorism to substantially reduce well-being. 
Arguably, one channel by which decentralization can increase societal welfare might be its 
impact on terrorism. Indeed, Frey and Luechinger (2004) argue that decentralized countries 
are politically and administratively more stable than more centralized states. For this reason, 
decentralized countries are less affected by terrorist attacks – as terrorists perceive the 
‘benefits’ of their activities to decrease with the degree of decentralization. In addition, 
according to traditional public choice arguments (Brennan and Buchanan, 1990, Tiebout 
1961), decentralization might yield efficiency gains in government activities and make the 
deterrence of terror through national security policies more effective. As a consequence, less 
terrorist activities should occur in more decentralized countries.   
However, the beneficial impact of decentralization on terror prevention is not as 
obvious as it might look at first sight. The public finance literature suggests that 
decentralization may harm the production of public safety. For example, decentralization may 
create coordination problems, lead to an underprovision and underfinancing of public safety, 
                                                 
1 Regarding the determinants of terror in the terrorists’ countries of origin see Freytag, Krüger and Schneider 
(2006). See Krieger and Meierrieks (2008) for a recent survey on the causes of terrorism.   3 
less policy innovation (Rose-Ackerman 1980, Strumpf 2002), and cause understaffing of 
security forces and other inefficiencies in fighting terrorism. In consequence, decentralization 
may make countries more vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as the marginal costs of committing 
terror are reduced, and we should expect transnational terrorism to be more frequent in such 
decentralized countries.  
The theoretical arguments underlying our analysis are mainly derived from Frey and 
Luechinger (2004), but also draw from traditional public finance literature. Surprisingly, the 
hypothesized effects of government decentralization on terror have not yet been empirically 
tested. This omission is most likely due to the lack of adequate data on terrorism and political 
decentralization until most recently. Clearly, answering the question whether decentralization 
deters or attracts terrorists bears important policy implications. Answering this question is the 
aim of this paper. 
Specifically, this paper fills the gap in the literature by testing empirically whether, to 
what extent, and through which channels decentralization reduces or promotes transnational 
terror, based on a panel of 109 countries over the period 1976-2000. To anticipate our results, 
we find that fiscal decentralization reduces the occurrence of transnational terrorist events, 
while decentralization of political-decision-making across government tiers does not affect 
terror. We also find evidence supporting the ‘system stability’ hypothesis of Frey and 
Luechinger (2004) rather than the ‘government efficiency’ hypothesis suggested by the 
traditional promoters of decentralization. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section derives our hypotheses. Section 3 
describes our measures of terrorism and decentralization, while the method of estimation is 
outlined in section 4. The fifth section presents the results and the final section concludes. 
   4 
2. Hypotheses 
We base our hypotheses on the effect of decentralization on transnational terror on two main 
and rather independent arguments. The first argument relates to the stability of the target 
country’s polity, and how it may be affected by terror (‘system stability hypothesis’).
2 The 
second builds on efficiency and effectiveness arguments regarding the provision of public 
safety (‘efficiency hypothesis’).  
Turning to the first argument, according to Frey and Luechinger (2004), one of the 
immediate main goals pursued by terrorists is to destabilize the polity of their target country.
3 
As Frey and Luechinger argue, “when the government loses power, and more importantly, 
when the political system’s legitimacy is eroded, the terrorists’ chances of achieving their 
goal improve” (ibidem, p.511). Thus, a governance structure that stabilizes the polity in a 
functional-systemic sense should decrease the marginal benefits of terrorist acts in a terrorists’ 
cost-benefit analysis, reducing the levels of terrorist activities. Linking the argument to 
decentralization, the authors argue that “a polity with many different centers of decision-
making and implementation is difficult, if not impossible, to destabilize” (ibidem, p.512).  
For illustration, we propose to think of a biological entity that is composed of a 
multitude of cells expanding in all three dimensions. In such multi-cell entity, the destruction 
of one cell does not endanger the entity as a whole, as the remaining cells can take over the 
functions of the dysfunctional one. This may be observable not only at the horizontal level 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, but less convincingly, more satisfied citizens might be less willing to support transnational 
terrorist groups (see, e.g., Li 2005, Dorn et al. 2007).   
3 Gassebner et al. (2007, 2008) provide empirical evidence. According to their results, terrorists are at least to 
some extent successful in destabilizing the political system, as terror attacks increase the probability of cabinet 
dissolutions. Two additional intermediate goals of terrorists, as discussed in Frey and Luechinger (2004), are to 
attract publicity and media attention, and to damage the economy to incur material costs on the population. As 
these aims are not directly related to decentralization, we do not discuss them here. See Schnellenbach (2006) for 
a recent discussion of terrorists’ motives.   5 
(namely across cells at the same level), but also in the vertical (across layers of cells).
4 
Applying this idea to states and their institutional settings, Frey and Luechinger (2004) 
analogously argue that lower-tier governments and administrations can take over 
responsibilities of dysfunctional – either higher-tier or other lower-tier – institutions. In 
contrast, in unitary countries non-functioning and destroyed (political and administrative) 
centers are likely to lead to country-wide collapse. Thus, decentralization may stabilize the 
polity by reducing the damage of terror on the governance structure, letting decentralized 
countries recover more quickly, and decreasing terrorists’ expected benefit. Consequently, 
Frey and Luechinger (2004) argue that ‘spatial decentralization’ – related to some kind of 
vertical  division of ‘decision-making’  power  but also ‘implementation’ power between 
various tiers of government – deters terror. These considerations lead to our first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Decentralization reduces the number of terrorist incidents. 
  
Turning to the second argument, decentralization of the politico-administrative system 
arguably makes governments more efficient and more effective in the provision of public 
goods  –  one of the governments’ core responsibilities (Musgrave, 1959). The economic 
theory of bureaucracy and the literature on institutional competition demonstrate that 
competition among public agencies reduces bureaucratic waste (e.g., Niskanen 1971), 
improves respect for regional differences in societal conditions of generating public safety 
(Tiebout 1961), serves as an information discovery procedure (Hayek 1968), strengthens 
democratic control over government spending activities ("voice"), and protects the interests of 
local minorities by facilitating "exit" (Hirschman 1970). Decentralization forces politicians to 
compete, leading to stronger local democracy, political accountability, and thus, citizens’ 
                                                 
4 The example mentioned in Frey and Luechinger (2004) regarding the elimination of a local government in 
Switzerland and neighboring communities taking over administrative functions relate to the horizontal level.   6 
control (Betz 1996). Decentralization thus permits dissenting residents to escape local security 
policies they do not agree to by moving to a different jurisdiction in a Tiebout fashion 
(Tiebout 1961), inducing incentives for competing local governments to innovate, to work 
efficiently and to target their security policies effectively (Brennan and Buchanan, 1990).
5 To 
the extent that decentralization improves security policies, we expect it to make terrorist’ 
activities more costly (in expected terms), reducing their optimal level of terror. 
The impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror is, however, 
not as obvious as it might look at first sight. Applying alternative public choice arguments 
that relate to the quality of public safety, decentralization might create coordination problems 
which may delay or prevent reforms, thus making terror prevention less effective.
6 Moreover, 
institutional constraints imposed by divided powers in decentralized countries might 
significantly weaken the federal and local governments’ ability to fight both domestic and 
transnational terror. More specifically, horizontal information externalities might imply the 
underprovision of policy innovation, preventing sensible institutional reforms that may 
aggravate these coordination problems and inefficiencies (Rose-Ackerman 1980, Strumpf 
2002). Moreover, competition between jurisdictions might cause a “race to the bottom,” 
driving local tax rates below the level necessary to sufficiently finance public safety, leading 
to its underprovision.
7 In general, small-sized jurisdictions might prevent internalization of 
positive externalities created by locally produced public safety and, thus, lead to understaffing 
of security forces. Consequently, decentralized governance structures might allow foreign 
                                                 
5 Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2005) show that policy innovation might occur more frequently in decentralized 
systems once politicians’ electoral motives are taken into account. 
6 Prud’homme (1995) and Sewell (1996) provide empirical support for this view. 
7 Empirical evidence is, however, not in favour of this hypothesis. For example, Dreher, Gaston and Martens 
(2008) do not find a significant impact of an index of globalization on tax competition in the OECD.   7 
terrorists to organize and manoeuvre more easily, thereby reducing the costs of transnational 
terrorist activity.
8  
In addition, according to Li (2005), the abundance of potential targets for terrorist acts 
makes it easier for terrorists to threaten a country’s population. To the extent that a country’s 
number and availability of ‘symbolic’ targets increase in its degree of political and fiscal 
decentralization, such country may become a more attractive target for foreign terrorists, as 
the number of low-cost targets rises.
9 Taken together, decentralization may make countries 
more vulnerable to foreign terrorists’ activities, and we should expect transnational terror to 
be more frequent in such decentralized countries.  
 We  thus  hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Decentralization increases the number of terrorist incidents. 
 
3. Measuring Decentralization and Terror 
Frey and Luechinger (2004) discuss the effects of two forms of decentralization – 
decentralization of ‘policy implementation’ and of ‘political decision-making’  (ibidem, 
p.512). Thus, their notion of decentralization captures the two dimensions of ‘federalism’ as 
defined by, e.g., Keman (2000) or Brennan and Buchanan (1980). According to Keman 
(2000), federalist structures comprise decentralization with respect to “the right to act,” on the 
one hand, and “the right to decide,” on the other.
10 In general, political scientists seem to 
                                                 
8 As one example, one might think of the coordination failure between the various state and federal institutions in 
the U.S. that prevented an early detection of the World Trade Tower attacks in the planning phase. 
9 However, the value of each particular target might decrease with the number of available targets, decreasing the 
expected benefit, and making decentralized countries less attractive. 
10 Similarly, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) define ’federalism’ to comprise the two dimensions: (i) joint 
assignment of functions and (ii) taxing power of lower levels of government.    8 
agree that federal structures include “a set of jurisdictional arrangements for allocating policy 
responsibilities between different levels of government; this refers to both policy-making and 
policy implementation.” (Italics by us) (Obinger et al., 2005, p.9).    
However, Frey and Luechinger (2004) argue that both decision-making and policy 
implementation constitute two separate dimensions of a well-functioning decentralized 
system. Thus, our analysis accounts for these two types of decentralization. Specifically, we 
distinguish between decentralization in government spending, on the one hand, and local 
political autonomy, on the other. The first most closely reflects the implementation of 
government policies through executing administrations and public goods creation (“the right 
to act,” Keman 2000), while ‘local political autonomy’ refers to the presence of political 
decision- and law-making power at the local level (“the right to decide,” Keman 2000). In 
political science, this latter concept is also referred to as ‘decision decentralization’ or ‘local 
autonomy’ (e.g., Treisman 2000).  
We employ two measures of decentralization obtained from Treisman (2002), a 
collection of various indicators of decentralization. Fiscal decentralization is measured 
employing data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), as originally presented 
in a dataset compiled by the World Bank and replicated in Treisman (2002).
11 The numerator 
of these measures is total expenditure of sub-federal government tiers, while the denominator 
is total spending by all levels of government.
12 Data are employed for the period 1976-2000 
                                                 
11 See http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm (July 6, 2007). 
12 The Treisman data provide an alternative measure of fiscal decentralization, often employed in the literature 
on federalism that relates to decentralization of revenue. Revenue decentralization is highly correlated with 
expenditure decentralization ( = 0.91). Inclusion of both measures of fiscal decentralization shows the 
dominance of spending decentralization over revenue decentralization (see Table 4 and the corresponding 
discussion).    9 
for a maximum of 109 countries.
13 Among the countries in our sample, spending 
decentralization is in the range of 1.65 to 55.62 percent. On average, 21.48 percent of 
government spending takes place at the sub-federal level (median: 20.27 percent). 
As proxy for political autonomy at the sub-federal level, we employ a dichotomous 
time-invariant indicator that takes the value ‘one’ if second tier governments “have autonomy 
in certain specified areas – i.e., constitutional authority to legislate – not explicitly subject to 
central laws,” equally collected around 1996-2000 and obtained from the Treisman cross-
section (2002). In other words, political autonomy is assumed to exist when the federal 
constitution stipulates that laws of the second tier cannot be overruled or constrained by 
framework legislation by the federal government (Riker 1964).
14 Prominent examples of such 
autonomous sub-federal entities are the U.S. states, which also differ in their legal systems, 
and the Swiss ‘cantons’, in contrast to the German ‘Laender’, where only policing and 
schooling are truly independent state responsibilities. Among our sample of countries, about 
16 percent are coded as federal with politically autonomous sub-federal tiers.  
However, note that despite the fact that our measure of fiscal decentralization seems to 
be those used most widely in empirical cross-national studies on the effects of centralization 
(e.g., Lijphart 1977, Fisman and Gatti 2002),
15 it is not free of problems. Kessing, Konrad and 
Kotsogiannis (2006) provide a summary: First, the sources of the revenues, intergovernmental 
                                                 
13 Selection of countries and years is driven by data availability. 
14  The Treisman (2002) data provides an alternative, weaker measure of political local autonomy, which also 
includes cases of so-called ‘residual’ autonomy, where political decisions at the local level fill the legal gaps in 
national framework laws, and may be overruled by national legislation. We test for the impact of this variable in 
the section on robustness.  
15 While this is true for cross-country studies, other political institutions such as direct democracy may be more 
important for the provisions of public goods on the state level within a country. For example, Fischer (2005) 
investigates whether direct democracy restricts the Leviathan-like behavior of bureaucracies using an index of 
direct democracy.    10 
transfers, and other grants are not taken into account. Second, our measure of fiscal 
decentralization does not account for the extent to which the jurisdictions’ tax bases overlap.
16 
Third and most importantly, it reflects only the distribution of spending responsibilities but 
does not contain information about the distribution of political power among the central and 
sub-national governments. It is for this reason we add a measure of political autonomy 
separately to our model.  
Turning to our measure of terrorist activity, we employ data provided in the MIPT 
Terrorism Knowledge Base.
17 The Terrorism Knowledge Base integrates data from the 
RAND Terrorism Chronology and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident databases, the Terrorism 
Indictment database, and DFI International's research on terrorist organizations.
18  
The Terrorism Knowledge Base defines terror as “violence, or the threat of violence, 
calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others 
into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. 
[…] This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The 
motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way 
that will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists usually claim 
credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the 
immediate physical damage of the cause, exerting long-term psychological repercussions on a 
particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to 
exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke 
governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce 
                                                 
16 See Treisman (2002) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) for a more detailed discussion. 
17 Available at: http://www.tkb.org/. 
18 There are various sources for terrorism data. We choose MIPT because it combines various sources and thus 
provides extensive country and yearly coverage. For a detailed discussion on the measurement of terrorism see 
Frey and Luechinger (2003b).   11 
compliance with their demands.”
19 As terrorist acts are defined by their nature (violent and 
criminal acts), they are included in the database irrespective of the identity of the committing 
group or their long-term goals. In principle, terrorist acts might well be carried out by the 
violent branch of the political opposition to the ruling government (e.g., the RAF in 
Germany).  
In this paper, we focus on incidences of transnational terrorism.
20 According to MIPT, 
transnational terror events are defined according to (1) the provenience of the terrorist or their 
group or (2) the nature of the terrorists’ targets. Thus transnational terrorisms involves either 
terrorists acting in a foreign country, domestic targets that are associated with a foreign 
country (such as embassies), or targets of an international character (such as airplanes or UN-
related entities). According to this definition, attacks of local residents against their own 
governments are only defined as transnational terror events if they occur in the name of an 
internationally working network of terrorists, such as, e.g., Al Qaeda. In contrast, attacks of 
foreigners would always be counted as ‘transnational’ incidences.
21 
To give two illustrative examples: an attack of the Indian embassy in Pakistan would 
be counted as a transnational terror act that occurred in Pakistan, while an attack to a Pakistani 
grocery store would be counted as domestic terrors act in Pakistan, if committed by a 
domestic terror group. However, if carried out by foreigners, by a group founded in a foreign 
country or affiliated with it, the attack on the grocery store would be counted as a 
transnational terror act in Pakistan. 
                                                 
19 See the glossary that accompanies the MIPT database. See also Enders and Sandler (1999, 2002).  
20 While our hypotheses directly refer to transnational terrorism, there is an additional reason for excluding 
domestic terror: reliable panel data on domestic terrorism is only available for a short (and recent) period of time. 
21 The definition of MIPT for transnational events is close to that of Sandlers and Enders (2004), who base it on 
either the terrorist group’s international ramifications or its foreign interest as target.    12 
We extract the number of transnational terror events for each country and year.
22 
Given that the database covers the whole world, we assign ‘zeros’ to all countries and years 
with no recordings. According to our sample of 109 countries from 1976-2000, the number of 
terrorist events per country during the total sample period varies from 0 to 50 with an average 
of about 1.70 (or 4.57 for those country-year observations with positive values). Altogether, 
there were 710 country-years with actual incidences of transnational terror in our panel (and 
1911 country-year observations altogether). Appendix C presents the average number of 
transnational terrorist events in the world by year. 
Figure 1 shows how the world average of terror events has evolved over time.
23 As 
can be seen, the average number of transnational terror events fluctuates around the mean 
from 1976 to 1996, slightly declines from 1996 on, and rises sharply again after 2000. We 
have to restrict our sample to the period prior to the year 2001 because data for our focal 
determinant, fiscal decentralization, is only available until 1999/2000.  
 















                                                 
22 Territories are assigned to the country formally governing the territory; if no assignment is possible, the 
observations are excluded from the sample (e.g. Kashmir and the Persian Gulf). 
23 For time-series studies on the occurrence and distribution of terrorism see Enders and Sandler (2005, 2006).   13 
4. Method 
We estimate random effects regressions for panel, non-negative count data. The data extend to 
a maximum of 109 countries and cover the years 1976-2000. Since some of the data are not 
available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the number of 
observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. As our data on terror events are 
strongly skewed to the right (with an accumulation of observations at zero) and display 
significant overdispersion (with the variance being greater than the mean), we estimate our 
regressions employing the Negative Binomial estimator. 
We estimate the following relationship: 
) , , ( 1 , 1 t t i jit it X decent F terror     , (1) 
where terrorit represents the number of recorded transnational terror events in country 
i in period t, and decentjit-1 is our j
th (lagged) measure of decentralization. Xi,t-1 is the vector of 
(lagged) control variables, and λt are fixed time effects. The low correlation between political 
autonomy and fiscal decentralization allows their joint inclusion.
24 As local autonomy shows 
no time series variation, the model is estimated with random effects. Note that the Hausman 
test favours this model over pooled Negative Binomial regressions. When employing fixed 
effects (and omitting local autonomy) as test for robustness the main results are unchanged. 
Note that our analysis focuses on the target countries of terrorism rather than its 
origins. In choosing our control variables, we thus follow Dreher and Gassebner (2008) who 
equally aim at analyzing terror in target countries. We employ GDP per capita (measured in 
constant 2000 US$). On the one hand, richer countries are more attractive targets for 
terrorists, as terror creates more media attention. On the other hand, richer countries can 
afford stronger police and intelligence agencies, potentially being more able to prevent terror. 
The impact of per capita GDP is thus not obvious a priori. 
                                                 
24 Correlation coefficient between political autonomy and fiscal decentralization is 0.4.   14 
A second variable suggested to be important for terror is the extent of civil liberties, 
comprising political participation possibilities and aspects of economic and social freedom 
(see Freedom House 2005). In the context of transnational terrorism, civil liberties most likely 
increase terror. Strongly democratic, economically liberal, mostly Western countries may 
attract transnational terrorist activities as they symbolize such ‘civil liberties’. In addition, 
politically free countries are frequently also allies of the United States and, thus, brought in 
association with its propagated values. Before 1990, such countries would have been chosen 
as preferred targets by pro-communist groups, in particular, while, after the breakdown of 
communist regimes violent anti-Western, pro-Islamic or anti-globalization groups may choose 
them as preferred targets.  
However, repressive states might be better able to suppress terror, e.g., through 
constraining the media echo or generating high levels of public safety (a prominent example 
is China).
25 On the other hand, transnational terror may even be attracted by the absence of 
political rights, possibly being correlated with a state in transition or decay, leading to 
dysfunctional administrative institutions and less effective public safety provision. Decreasing 
the costs of terror acts, such countries are more likely to become preferred targets, particularly 
if, despite the institutional decay, media response can be expected (a prominent example is 
Iraq).
26 In line with Piazza (2006) and Dreher and Gassebner (2008), we include both the level 
of and changes in political freedom. 
                                                 
25 There is also literature relating political participation to the local residents’ willingness to support terror 
groups. Arguably, this argument is more likely to hold for domestic terrorism, interpreting terror as form of 
‘expressive’ voting (see, e.g., Frey and Luechinger 2003a, 2004, Li 2005, Li and Schaub 2005). 
26 Sandler (1995) provides an excellent discussion of the early literature on the relationship between democracy 
and terror. Iraq is a present-time example of the relation between missing political freedom and ‘imported’ 
transnational terrorism. The occupation by the USA guarantees considerable media attention in a country 
apparently serving as battle field for neighboring countries’ terror groups fighting for regional hegemony.   15 
Third, we include population size, as in larger countries transnational attacks might 
attract greater international media attention. Furthermore, the costs of state surveillance and 
policing arguably rise with population size, leading to lower levels of public safety (Piazza 
2006).  
Fourth, we include government fractionalization. According to Piazza (2006), to some 
extent the number of parties in power proxies for “social cleavage,” potentially giving rise to 
terror: Domestic social cleavages, reducing social cohesion, social capital such as careful 
neighborhood watching and social control (Putnam 2000), however, might reduce the costs of 
transnational terrorism. On the other hand, fractionalized coalition governments may 
represent a larger number of social groups compared to a single party government (Lijphart 
1977), decreasing social tensions in society and, thus, contributing to system stability which 
reduces transnational terrorists’ expected benefits.  
Finally, we include data on voting coincidence with the U.S. in the UN General 
Assembly as provided by Voeten (2004). As shown in Dreher and Gassebner (2008), 
countries voting more frequently in line with the U.S. in the Assembly are more likely to 
become victims of terror. This effect may be particularly strong for transnational terror, where 
foreign terrorists may attack the more vulnerable allied countries as substitute for the better 
protected and less accessible USA. We follow Thacker (1999), coding votes in agreement 
with the U.S. as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The 
resulting numbers are then divided by the total number of votes in each year. This results in a 
variable ranging from zero to one, with zero indicating total disagreement with the U.S., and 
one showing full agreement. 
Data for per capita GDP and population are taken from the World Bank (2006). 
Government fractionalization is from Beck et al. (2001) and measures the probability that two 
randomly drawn members from among the government are of different parties. Level and   16 
change in political freedom are based on the average of the two political rights and civil 
liberties indices from Freedom House (2005), with levels measured on a scale from -7 (low) 




5.1. Baseline Model 
Table 1 shows the results. We first include fiscal decentralization and political autonomy 
separately (columns 1 and 2), while column 3 includes them jointly. All models include 
dummies for each year, which are always jointly significant at the one percent level. Overall, 
our results for the control variables mirror those reported in Piazza (2006) and Dreher and 
Gassebner (2008). As can be seen, the number of terror events increases with larger 
population, possibly reflecting greater social and ethnic cleavages but also larger international 
media response. (However, it may well reflect a simple scale effect, as larger countries 
experience more terror events, c.p.) The coefficient of population size is significant at least at 
the five percent level, while the impact of government fractionalization is marginally 
insignificant according to the full model of column 3, but significant at the five percent level 
at least in columns 1 and 2.
27 In two of the three specifications, terror also rises with the level 
of civil liberties and greater voting coincidence with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly, at 
least at the ten percent level of significance. As argued before, both may capture the proximity 
of a country’s democratic value system and foreign policy to that of the U.S., making the 
country a ‘substitute target’, but with possibly lower ‘entry’ costs. GDP per capita is not 
consistently significant at conventional levels, which is consistent with Krueger and 
                                                 
27 The coefficients are significant at the five percent level at least – with the exception of government 
fractionalization which is marginally insignificant according to column 3.   17 
Malečková  (2003) and Abadie (2006). Changes in political freedom have no significant 
impact on terror according to all specifications. 
Turning to our variables of primary interest, the results show a significant effect of 
expenditure decentralization on terror, at the ten percent level of significance in column 1, and 
at the one percent level according to the full model of column 3. Our results show that more 
spending responsibilities for local governments reduce the number of terror events in the 
target country. This result is in line with our a priori hypothesis regarding the division of 
administrative and executing responsibilities across government tiers. Calculating the 
marginal effect of fiscal decentralization for the full model (column 3), the results show that 
the number of terror events declines by 0.03 with an increase in decentralization by one 
percentage point. Thus, for example, evaluated at the sample mean, the model predicts that 
raising the share of sub-federal spending from 20% to 50% (which is realistic given the 
variation in our regression sample from 1.5% to 55.6%) will reduce the number of incidences 
by almost half from 1.49 to 0.76. Clearly, this impact is quantitatively relevant and bears 
important welfare implications.
28  
The results of columns 2 and 3 also show that local political autonomy does not affect 
the number of terror events, neither separately nor when included jointly with fiscal 
decentralization. This finding contradicts the hypothesis that more political autonomy deters 
terrorism. Potentially, the insignificance of political autonomy might be caused by two 
opposing effects: on the one hand, local decision-making power might well decrease 
terrorists’ marginal benefits through political stabilization or enhancements of local public 
safety provision (Frey and Luechinger 2004); on the other hand, a politically decentralized 
                                                 
28 See Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2004) for an attempt to measure the welfare costs of terrorism.   18 
government may also provide more numerous potential symbolic-bearing targets for terrorist 
attacks, as Li (2005) argues. Unfortunately, both effects cannot be disentangled.
29  
  Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 distinguish terror events that can be considered to be 
marginal from those which are severe. For the latter, we count all terrorist events in which at 
least one person was physically harmed – namely all events in which the number of persons 
killed or injured was greater than zero. Of course, it is debatable which threshold constitutes a 
severe event. Following Dreher, Gassebner and Siemers (2007), we choose the lowest threshold 
possible. While this may be the most simple/intuitively appealing choice from our point of 
view, we are clearly aware that even ‘less severe’ events may still have a major psychological 
or economic impact on the population as, e.g., the London bombings of July 21, 2005. 
Columns 4 and 5 suggest that the overall results observed previously are driven by 
severe events. Significant at the 1 percent level, fiscal decentralization reduces the number of 
severe terror events but does not affect less severe events at conventional levels of 
significance. According to the marginal effects in column 4, an increase in fiscal 
decentralization reduces the number of severe terror events by 0.15, which is quantitatively 
about 5 times larger as compared to the effect for the overall sample. For illustration, a 
simulated rise in the degree of spending decentralization from 20% to 50% (which is realistic 
given the variation in our regression sample from 1.5% to 55.6%) would decrease the 
predicted number of severe terror events by roughly 2.7, from 3.9 down to 1.2. Compared to 
the effect for all events, the decrease in absolute terms is more than quadruple in size (-0.63 
versus -2.7).  
Table 2 tests for the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional variables 
that have been proposed as determinants of terror in the previous literature or are intuitively 
appealing as such. As in Piazza (2006) and Dreher and Gassebner (2008), we test for the 
                                                 
29 Results are qualitatively identical when a Tobit model is estimated or a dichotomous variable of the 
occurrence of transnational terror is analyzed with Logit estimation.    19 
sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of population growth and GDP growth. According 
to Piazza (2006), the first puts pressure on a countries’ economic and political system, 
increasing an attack’s destructive impact on the polity, rising terrorists’ expected benefits. 
However, GDP growth may equally well be correlated with reductions in poverty, potentially 
increasing terrorists’ costs through improved governance quality. We will turn to the role of 
governance quality below. In addition to government fractionalization that is included in the 
main regression, we also test for the impact of four alternative measures of ‘social cleavage’ 
that make the polity more vulnerable to attacks: ethnic fractionalization, language 
fractionalization, religion fractionalization, and fractionalization of the parliamentary 
opposition. Similarly, recently founded states might have still weak and ineffective 
institutions, contributing to their system instability and insufficient public goods provision. 
We also include a dichotomous variable that takes the value ‘one’ if the country is in a state of 
internal or external war. Again, analogously to the previous argument, we can expect 
government institutions to not work well and basic human rights to be severely constrained at 
times of war, giving rise to system instability, promising greater damage and decreasing costs 
of terror acts. (Note that we analyze the potential direct effects of governance quality below.) 
Finally, we test for the hypothesis that inertia may play a role by adding the lagged dependent 
variable on the right hand side of the equation. 
As can be seen from Table 2, most of the additional variables are completely 
insignificant. The exceptions are the war dummy and the dummy for new states that are 
significant at the five percent level, with a positive and, respectively, a negative coefficient. 
Column 9 shows that the main findings are insensitive to the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable as measure of inertia, which turns out significant at the 1 percent level.
30 
Most importantly, in all specifications the negative impact of expenditure decentralization on 
                                                 
30 This result holds when OLS is applied. Note that the Hurwicz (1950) bias is sufficiently small to justify non-
instrumentation of the lagged dependent variable with a time-series dimension of about 30 years.   20 
terror stays significant at the five percent level. Moreover, its coefficient is of similar size 
across all estimated models, which shows that decentralization is not strongly correlated with 
any of these new determinants added to the model. The main findings equally prevail when 
alternative estimation methods are applied, such as Tobit and Logit estimators (not 
reported).
31  
The Treisman data provides an alternative index of weaker political local autonomy, 
which measures so-called ‘residual’ autonomy, where political decisions at the local level fill 
the legal gaps in national laws, and may be overruled by national legislation.
32 Replacing 
‘political autonomy’ with this ‘residual autonomy’ measure yields qualitatively identical 
results in all models of Tables 1 and 2 (not reported). 
We conclude that our results are robust to the choice of control variables.
33  
 
5.2. Transmission channels of decentralization  
As described in the theory section above, decentralization may reduce terror because it makes 
the political system and the polity more stable (‘system stability hypothesis’) and thus more 
immune against the negative effects of transnational terrorist acts, decreasing terrorists’ 
expected benefit. Alternatively, decentralization may simply yield efficiency gains and 
improve effectiveness in the provision of ‘public safety’, increasing the terrorists’ expected 
costs, so that our measure of general decentralization only approximates the cost structure of 
providing public goods.  
                                                 
31 Tobit models do not take account of the (count) structure of the data, while Logit can not use information 
contained in the frequency of attacks but reduces this information to a binary dependent variable, indicating the 
occurrence of terror instead. 
32 A prominent example of such political autonomy is the German Laender. 
33 We also replicated the analysis for a sample of countries without political autonomy. The results are not 
affected.   21 
In Table 3, we test for a potential transmission channel of the beneficial impact of 
fiscal decentralization, augmenting our baseline model with two measures of production 
efficiency and effectiveness: First, we employ an indicator of bureaucratic quality, obtained 
from the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) Political Risk database, for the years 
1984 to 2005. Second, we use a measure of government effectiveness, available from the year 
1996 onwards, and constructed by Kaufman et al. (2003). The first measure is based on 
information on subjective evaluations of "autonomy from political pressure," "strength and 
expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services" 
when governments change, and "established mechanisms for recruiting and training" (PRS 
Group, 1998). Government effectiveness measures the competence of the bureaucracy and the 
quality of public service delivery, based on a substantial number of perceptions-based 
indicators from various surveys on government swiftness of response, efficiency and 
effectiveness in meeting local and national demands, mostly based on information collected 
from internationally working businessmen and managers (Kaufman et al., 2003).
34 For both 
measures, higher values indicate more bureaucratic control or government effectiveness, 
respectively. 
If the ‘efficiency hypothesis’ holds, the inclusion of either direct measure of 
government efficiency would arguably reduce the effects of decentralization – in terms of size 
and/or statistical significance. When the ‘political system stability hypothesis’ prevails, 
decentralization should still play a major role for explaining the occurrence of terror even 
when we control for government effectiveness.  
                                                 
34 The public goods production evaluated by Kaufman et al. (2003) includes, for example, tax collection, 
effective implementation of national policies and government decisions, coordination between government tiers, 
civil service and quality of bureaucracy, and national infrastructure (telecommunication, electricity, 
transportation), response to natural disasters, government personnel quality, issues of institutional rigidity, 
government stability and policy consistency, trust in police, and quality of public schools.    22 
Table 3 shows the baseline regressions of columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, augmented with 
the two measures of government effectiveness and reduction of bureaucratic waste. For 
comparison, Table 3 also contains the baseline model excluding measures of government 
efficiency, estimated for the identical regression sample. This sample is smaller than the one 
used for the original model of Table 1 above, due to missing data. Again, fiscal 
decentralization is negatively related to the occurrence of transnational terror events. Columns 
1 and 3 show that improved government quality measured by the ICRG index significantly 
reduces transnational terror (at the five percent level), in support of the ‘efficiency 
hypothesis’. The insignificance of the Kaufman index of government effectiveness, albeit 
with a negative coefficient, might be due to the substantially smaller regression sample, 
excluding all observations prior to 1996 (and thus most of our original sample). As in Table 1, 
the inclusion of political autonomy (not significant) does not qualitatively alter these main 
results throughout.  
Turning to the effect of fiscal decentralization, the coefficients of our decentralization 
measures become marginally insignificant when the Kaufmann index is included. In all 
regressions shown in Table 3 the negative sign remains. Obviously, the smaller sample size is 
an obstacle to identifying the effects. In contrast, in the larger samples with about 500 
observations (for the ICRG index in columns 1 through 4), the impact of fiscal 
decentralization is either significant at conventional levels or only marginally insignificant. In 
addition, the coefficients of decentralization are similar across models including and 
excluding government effectiveness. Calculating the marginal effects for decentralization 
reveals the same picture. Also note that the levels of significance are not substantially lower 
as compared to the original model in Table 1 above.  
In summary, we do not find that the impact of decentralization on terror is mediated by 
government effectiveness and bureaucratic quality. Our results thus rather support the ‘system   23 
stability hypothesis’ proposed by Frey and Luechinger (2004), although we can not directly 
test for this channel. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper empirically analyzes the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of 
transnational terror using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-
2000. We find that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of terror events in a target 
country, while political decentralization has no impact. In the words of Keman (2000), we 
find the ‘power to act (= spend)’ to matter more than the ‘power to decide’ for the fight 
against transnational terrorism.  
Building closely on Frey and Luechinger (2004) – also in distinguishing 
decentralization of policy implementation from decentralization of political decision-making 
– our empirical analysis suggests that effective local government administrations (potentially 
taking over responsibilities from other dysfunctioning local or supra-local administrations) are 
more important in stabilizing a country than the dispersion of actual decision-making 
authority at the local level. However, local spending autonomy may simply increase 
competition among jurisdictions, thereby improving the quality of ‘security’. Our attempt to 
empirically discriminate between these two channels of decentralization yields findings in 
support of the ‘system stability hypothesis’ rather than the ‘efficiency hypothesis’.  
Our results bear important policy implications. Since the seminal work of Becker 
(1968), economists view undertaking criminal acts as the outcome of rational decision-
making. Applying this rational choice model of criminal behavior to terrorists’ decisions, 
additional terror will occur when the expected marginal benefit of an additional terrorist act 
outweighs its marginal costs. Indeed, it has been shown that the propensity to commit terrorist 
acts can be influenced by changes in external costs and benefits (Enders and Sandler 1995). 
Traditional strategies for combating terror aim at raising the direct or opportunity costs of   24 
committing such acts, while more recent approaches focus on reducing the (expected) benefits 
of terrorist activity, particularly in light of failing deterrence strategies (Lichbach 1987, Frey 
1988, Sandler and Enders 2004, Wilkinson 2002). In this paper, we have shown that greater 
spending decentralization might be one instrument to influence terrorists’ marginal costs and 
benefits, reducing the occurrence of transnational terror. Previous research has argued that 
decentralized spending competences lead to inefficient overspending and create problems of 
coordination, thereby preventing effective security and finally making a country more 
attractive for terrorist activity. As we have shown in this paper, on average, the opposite is 
true: decentralization reduces transnational terror. However, we find no evidence that this 
effect is due to improvements in the quality of governance. Although we can not test for this 
directly, decentralization affects terror most likely through stabilizing the political and 
administrative organization in a country, as suggested by Frey and Luechinger (2004). 
According to these results some policy makers’ calls for greater centralization in the ‘fight 
against terrorism’ should be treated with caution. 
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Table 1: Decentralization and Terror, NBR, 1976-2000  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal decentralization (t-1) -0.015* -0.022*** -0.040*** 0.007
[1.82] [2.65] [4.12] [0.71]
Political autonomy 0.321 0.139 -0.378 0.214
[1.43] [0.49] [1.29] [0.71]
(log) GDP per capita (t-1) 0.219** 0.104 0.174 0.132 0.187
[2.13] [1.44] [1.59] [1.01] [1.32]
(log) Population (t-1) 0.462*** 0.160** 0.407*** 0.625*** 0.099
[4.98] [2.48] [3.85] [5.24] [0.91]
Political freedom (t-1) 0.104* 0.034 0.151** 0.216*** -0.051
[1.71] [0.81] [2.25] [2.61] [0.49]
Political freedom, change -0.002 -0.102 0.013 0.065 0.037
[0.01] [1.31] [0.10] [0.34] [0.18]
Government fractionalization (t-1) 0.538** 0.548*** 0.418 0.601* -0.162
[2.27] [3.20] [1.62] [1.77] [0.41]
Voting with U.S. (t-1) 1.458** 0.557 1.524** 2.399** -0.714
[2.05] [1.03] [2.04] [2.50] [0.62]
Constant -10.735*** -3.223** -9.220*** -12.962*** -5.720**
[5.34] [2.31] [3.99] [4.84] [2.26]
Observations 934 1911 826 826 826
Sample all all all severe less severe
Number of countries 76 109 63 63 63
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
All regressions include time fixed effects.
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events in a 
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 Table 2: Decentralization and Terror, NBR, 1976-2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Fiscal decentralization (t-1) -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.019** -0.021** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.020**
[2.64] [2.62] [2.77] [2.25] [2.48] [2.95] [2.65] [2.75] [2.52]
Political autonomy 0.139 0.139 0.172 0.266 0.095 0.226 0.131 0.259 0.275
[0.49] [0.49] [0.58] [0.96] [0.32] [0.79] [0.46] [0.83] [1.01]
(log) GDP per capita (t-1) 0.185* 0.174 0.056 0.165 0.196 0.099 0.177 0.064 0.194*
[1.68] [1.58] [0.47] [1.57] [1.63] [0.83] [1.59] [0.53] [1.84]
(log) Population (t-1) 0.411*** 0.407*** 0.331*** 0.356*** 0.413*** 0.441*** 0.409*** 0.363*** 0.379***
[3.90] [3.85] [3.02] [3.41] [3.87] [4.15] [3.85] [2.94] [3.78]
Political freedom (t-1) 0.150** 0.151** 0.159** 0.191*** 0.159** 0.130* 0.153** 0.155* 0.130**
[2.23] [2.24] [2.35] [2.80] [2.29] [1.89] [2.25] [1.89] [1.99]
Political freedom, change 0.019 0.013 -0.025 0.010 0.019 0.012 0.014 -0.034 0.014
[0.14] [0.10] [0.19] [0.07] [0.14] [0.09] [0.10] [0.24] [0.10]
Government fractionalization (t-1) 0.413 0.417 0.377 0.373 0.406 0.448* 0.420 0.530* 0.292
[1.60] [1.62] [1.45] [1.48] [1.57] [1.74] [1.63] [1.88] [1.15]
Voting with U.S. (t-1) 1.519** 1.524** 1.674** 0.996 1.510** 1.933** 1.491* 1.583* 1.220*
[2.03] [2.04] [2.18] [1.33] [2.02] [2.45] [1.93] [1.93] [1.68]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.005
[0.40]
Population growth (t-1) 0.000
[0.01]












dependent variable (t-1) 0.035***
[5.70]
Constant -9.390*** -7.544*** -5.019** -8.350*** -9.582*** -9.010*** -9.279*** -5.645** -8.89***
[4.06] [3.31] [2.04] [3.70] [3.91] [3.90] [3.96] [2.22] [4.05]
Observations 823 826 767 767 826 826 826 717 826
Number of countries 63 63 60 60 63 63 63 54 63
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
All regressions include time fixed effects.
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events in a particular year and country.
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Table 3: Transmission channels of decentralization, NBR, 1976-2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bureaucratic quality (t-1) -0.116** -0.116**
[2.47] [2.30]
Gov. effectiveness (t-1) -0.501 -0.65
[0.95] [1.03]
Political autonomy 0.106 0.034 0.061 0.03
[0.33] [0.10] [0.08] [0.04]
Fiscal decentralization (t-1) -0.017 -0.021* -0.024** -0.029** -0.031 -0.035 -0.033 -0.038
[1.50] [1.84] [2.02] [2.42] [1.42] [1.58] [1.23] [1.45]
marginal effects -0.02 -0.026 -0.026 -0.034 -0.01 -0.011 -0.01 -0.012
fiscal decentralization  1.42 1.7 1.82 2.07 1.38 1.53 1.19 0.89
(log) GDP per capita (t-1) 0.288* 0.15 0.324** 0.196 0.523 0.164 0.621 0.146
[1.87] [1.02] [1.99] [1.25] [1.09] [0.58] [1.09] [0.46]
(log) Population (t-1) 0.626*** 0.604*** 0.614*** 0.599*** 0.754*** 0.735*** 0.790*** 0.781***
[5.43] [5.07] [4.64] [4.37] [3.54] [3.52] [3.08] [3.09]
Political freedom (t-1) 0.104 0.098 0.105 0.11 -0.036 -0.068 -0.01 -0.016
[1.20] [1.12] [1.12] [1.18] [0.16] [0.32] [0.04] [0.06]
Political freedom, change -0.209 -0.19 -0.234 -0.209 -0.913 -0.996 -0.899 -1.007
[1.27] [1.19] [1.37] [1.25] [1.49] [1.64] [1.38] [1.54]
Government fractionalization (t-1) 0.886*** 0.930*** 0.680** 0.690** 0.5 0.469 0.179 0.048
[2.85] [2.97] [2.05] [2.03] [0.61] [0.57] [0.19] [0.05]
Voting with U.S. (t-1) 2.320** 1.533* 2.614** 1.861* 4.457* 4.811* 4.766 5.292*
[2.42] [1.67] [2.57] [1.89] [1.74] [1.94] [1.52] [1.76]
Constant -11.529*** -10.682*** -13.267*** -10.909*** -3.967 -1.539 -3.028 -1.416
[4.59] [4.23] [4.57] [3.70] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 517 517 463 463 149 149 136 136
Number of countries 58 58 49 49 48 48 43 43
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
All regressions include time fixed effects.
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Regressions in columns 2, 4, 6, 8 are based on the regression samples in regressions 1, 3, 5 and 7, respectively.  
The dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events in a particular year and country. A terror event is defined as severe 
when  at least one person has been injured or killed.   28 
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Appendix A: Descriptions and sources 
Variable Definition Source
Number of terror events Number of transnational terror events for each country and year, 
defined as “violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an 
atmosphere of fear and alarm.”
MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base
Fiscal decentralization Total expenditure of sub-national government tiers divided by total 
spending by all levels of government.
IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics
Political autonomy Dichotomous indicator of autonomy of second tier governments that 
takes on the value of one if “subnational legislatures have autonomy 
in certain specified areas – i.e. constitutional authority to legislate – 
not explicitly subject to central laws.”
Treisman (2002)
(log) GDP per capita Gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars.
World Bank (2006)
(log) Population Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, 
which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship, 
except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum.
World Bank (2006)
Political freedom Average value of political rights and civil liberties, ranging from -7 to 
-1, where higher values reflect greater freedom. 
Freedom House (2005)
Political freedom, change Yearly change in index ranging from 1 to 7, where higher values 
reflect greater freedom. 
Freedom House (2005)
Government fractionalization Probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
government parties will be of different parties( low(0)-high(1)).
Beck et al. (2001)
Voting with U.S. Votes in agreement with the US are coded as 1, votes in disagreement 
as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The resulting numbers are 
then divided by the total number of votes in each country and year. 
Dreher and Sturm (2006)
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars. 
World Bank (2006)
Population growth Annual population growth rate, based on the de facto definition of 
population.
World Bank (2006)
New state, dummy The timing of national independence (0 if before 1914; 1 if between 
1914 and 1945; 2 if between 1946 and 1989; and 3 if after 1989).
Gallup et al. (2001)
War, dummy Dummy for countries that had external war over the period 1960-85. Gallup et al. (2001)
Ethnic fractionalization Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Language fractionalization Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Religious fractionalization Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Opposition fractionalization Probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
opposition parties will be of different parties( low(0)-high(1)).
Beck et al. (2001)
Bureaucratic quality Index of bureaucratic quality on a scale of 1-12, with higher values 
indicating higher quality.
PRS Group (1998)
Government effectiveness ‘Government effectiveness’ component of the Kaufman governance 
quality indicator of 1998. According to Kaufman et al. (2003), this 
indicator is based on a regression with data from various distinct 
sources and reflects the quality of public service provision and of the 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of 
the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index 
is on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and 
implement good policies and deliver public goods. The value of the 
index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5.
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of terror events 1.70 4.59 0.00 50.00
Fiscal decentralization 20.84 13.48 1.45 55.62
Political autonomy 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
(log) GDP per capita 7.51 1.53 4.31 10.64
(log) Population 15.95 1.61 12.29 20.95
Political freedom -3.66 1.97 -7.00 -1.00
Political freedom, change 0.03 0.46 -4.00 3.50
Government fractionalization 0.20 0.29 0.00 1.00
Voting with U.S. 0.30 0.15 0.06 0.84
GDP growth 3.08 5.79 -51.03 38.20
Population growth 1.73 1.44 -16.55 18.71
New state, dummy 1.25 1.03 0.00 3.00
War, dummy 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Ethnic fractionalization 0.43 0.26 0.00 0.93
Language fractionalization 0.39 0.29 0.00 0.92
Religious fractionalization 0.41 0.25 0.00 0.86
Opposition fractionalization 0.49 0.29 0.00 1.00
Bureaucratic quality 8.71 2.99 2 12
Government effectiveness 0.68 0.89 -0.965 2.16  
Note: Statistics are based on the estimation sample of Table 1, column 2. 
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